The Economics of Collective Brands by Arthur Fishman et al.










We consider the consequences of a shared brand name such as geographical names used
to identify high quality products, for the incentives of otherwise autonomous ﬁrms to
invest in quality. We contend that such collective brand labels improve communication
between sellers and consumers, when the scale of production is too small for individual
ﬁrms to establish reputations on a stand alone basis. This has two opposing eﬀects on
member ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in quality. On the one hand, it increases investment
incentives by increasing the visibility and transparency of individual member ﬁrms, which
increases the return from investment in quality. On the other hand, it creates an incentive
to free ride on the group’s reputation, which can lead to less investment in quality. We
identify parmater values under which collective branding delivers higher quality than is
achievable by stand alone ﬁrms.1 Introduction
Geographical names have been used to identify high quality products since ancient times.
Corinthian wines, almonds from Naxos and Sicilian honey have been renowned for their
quality since the 4th century BC (Bertozi, 1995). Other examples include Parma ham,
California fruits, Jaﬀa oranges, and Washington apples. Some of these regional brands,
such as spirits from Burgundy, Champagne, Chianti and Cognac are marketed individ-
ually by individual producers while others are marketed collectively, either by producer
owned ﬁrms or by State Trading Enterprises (STEs). Two central features characterize
these brands. First, their brand label are perceived as badges of superior quality by con-
sumers who are willing to pay premium prices for them (e.g. Landon and Smith (1998)
and Loureiro and McCluskey (2000, 2003)). Second, individual member - producers are
generally autonomous ﬁrms, which make independent business decisions and retain their
own proﬁts, and only share a brand name.
The fact that collective brand labels are associated with superior quality suggests
that ﬁrms which are members of these brands invest more to maintain brand quality
than they would as stand alone ﬁrms (or at least are perceived to do so by consumers).
This seems surprising. If consumers’ perception of the collective brand label’s quality is
jointly determined by their experience with the qualities provided by diﬀerent individual
members, and if the provision of high quality requires costly investment, it would seem
that each member has an incentive to free ride on the investments of fellow members. If
so, why are these brand labels perceived as badges of quality?
It is true that in some cases, the perception of superior quality may be partly
attributable to exogenous advantages such as climate, soil quality, access to superior
inputs, technology and so on. However, even when such natural advantages are present
the achievement of superior quality presumably also requires the requisite investment
of eﬀort and other resources. The free riding problem might also be mitigated to some
extent by monitoring the eﬀorts and investments of individual members to maintain
quality standards. However, monitoring is costly and imperfect and is therefore unlikely
1to eliminate free riding altogether. Thus it would seem that producers have less of an
incentive to invest in quality as members of a collective brand than they would as stand
alone ﬁrms.
The purpose of this paper is to show that, despite the incentive to free ride, mem-
bers of collective brands may nevertheless have a greater incentive to invest in quality
than stand alone ﬁrms. Thus institutions like STE’s, may increase welfare by providing
consumers with better quality.
This has important implications for the current public debate concerning antitrust
policy in the agricultural sector. For example, demands to ban STE’s and limit regional
branding have been voiced during recent rounds of the World Trade Organization nego-
tiations on the grounds that these institutions reduce welfare and market eﬃciency by
endowing their members with market power. Our analysis suggests that these institu-
tions, by facilitating collective branding, can have positive welfare eﬀects by promoting
more eﬃcient investment in quality.1
The idea is the following. When product quality is diﬃcult to observe before
purchase and is revealed to consumers only after consuming the product (‘experience
goods’), their perception of quality and the amount they are willing to pay for the prod-
uct is based on past experience with the product - its reputation. Thus the extent to
which a ﬁrm is able to receive a good return on its investment in quality depends on
how well consumers are informed about its past performance. When information about
past performance disseminates imperfectly, such as through word of mouth communica-
tion, the extent to which consumers are informed is likely to depend on the number of
consumers who have experienced the product in the past. In particular, the smaller the
ﬁrm the less informed its customers are about its past quality. Small ﬁrms may therefore
be unable to eﬀectively establish individual reputations on their own and consequently
will have little incentive to invest in quality. Here collective branding may come to the
1An alternative position expressed in defense of STE’s is that they provide economies of scale in
production and promotion.
2rescue and serve as a vehicle for reputation formation by facilitating the transmission of
information about quality to consumers.
Speciﬁcally, suppose individual ﬁrms which are too small to establish good rep-
utations on their own market their products under a collective brand name, sharing
a collective reputation, while otherwise retaining full autonomy. Since their collective
brand name covers a larger segment of the market than that of any individual mem-
ber ﬁrm, the customers of each individual member are more likely to have previously
experienced or interacted with past customers of the same brand, albeit not with that
particular seller. This ‘reputation eﬀect’ of collective branding increases the value of a
good reputation and hence may increase members’ incentive to invest in quality even if
brand membership has no eﬀect on individual members’ market share.
But as noted above, branding may also have an opposing eﬀect on investment
incentives. Unless the brand is able to eﬀectively monitor individual investment, sharing
a collective reputation may encourage individual members to free ride on the eﬀorts of
other members. Therefore the full eﬀect of collective branding on investment in quality
is determined by the interaction of these two opposing factors - the fact that, on the
one hand, a good collective reputation is more valuable than a stand alone reputation,
against the incentive to free ride, on the other.
Accordingly, we analyze the eﬀects of branding in two polar cases. First, as a
benchmark, we consider the case in which the brand can deter free riding by perfectly
monitoring members’ investments and expelling members which don’t invest. We show
that in that case, since only the reputation eﬀect is operative, a brand member’s incentive
to invest is always greater than that of a stand alone ﬁrm. Moreover, the incentive
increases with brand size (the number of ﬁrms which are members of the brand) - the
larger the brand, the greater the incentive of each member to invest and therefore the
more proﬁtable membership is.
We ﬁnd that this pro - investment eﬀect of collective branding also extends to
the case in which the brand is unable to monitor individual members’ investment. In
3particular, we show that collective branding can always enable at least some high ability
ﬁrms to invest in quality when no stand alone ﬁrms will. Thus collective branding can
always lead to higher expected quality in the market. Moreover, if either (i) investment
is a suﬃciently important ingredient for the attainment of high quality - that is, if the
diﬀerence between the expected product quality of a ﬁrm which invests in quality and
one which doesn’t is suﬃciently large - and/or (ii) ﬁrms with the ability to produce high
quality through investment are suﬃciently scarce, then collective branding enables most
or all high ability ﬁrms to invest in quality when stand alone ﬁrms will not.
However, in contrast to perfect monitoring case, this is true only if brand size
is not too large. If the brand is too large, the marginal contribution of an individual
member’s investment to the brand’s reputation becomes too small to override free riding,
reducing the brand’s incentive to invest relative to stand alone ﬁrms.
In an econometric study of the determinants of reputation in the Italian wine
industry, Castriota and Delmastro (2008) show that brand reputation is increasing in
the number of bottles produced by the brand and decreasing in the number of individual
producers in the brand. This is consistent with our analysis. Keeping output ﬁxed,
an increase in the number of individual producers has no reputation eﬀect since the
number of units whose quality consumers observe is unchanged. However, it does increase
the incentive for free riding (which increases with the number of members), and hence
lowers investment incentives and reduces the brand’s reputation. Conversely, keeping the
number of individual producers ﬁxed, increasing output does not increase the incentive
to free ride but does increase the reputation eﬀect and hence increases incentives to
invest.
An experimental study by Huck and L˝ uncer (2009) is also consistent with our
analysis. They ﬁnd that more sellers invest in quality when buyers are informed about
the average past quality of all sellers - which corresponds to a collective brand in our
model - than when they only know the record of the seller from whom they actually
buy. However, as in our model, when the number of sellers increases, the average quality
4declines.
Finally, our analysis suggests that a regional brand may be viewed as an institution
to regulate the collective brand size, keeping the number of producers large enough to
enable successful reputation building but small enough to discourage individual free rid-
ing on the brand name. Thus one might speculate that a regional brand like Champagne
wines owes its success not only to unique soil and climate but also to fortuitous natural
boundaries which encompass “just the right” number of producers under its brand label.
1.1 Relationship to the Literature
Our emphasis on the centrality of a ﬁrms’ reputation for quality for its success con-
nects with the large and growing literature on ﬁrm reputation with a similar emphasis,
e.g., Klein and Leﬄer (1981) Shapiro (1982), Kreps (1990), Tadelis (1999), Mailath and
Samuelson (2001), Horner (2002). Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000) and Gorton (1996) provide
empirical evidence that ﬁrms with reputation behave diﬀerently from ﬁrms without it.
All of those papers are concerned with the reputation of individual ﬁrms. By contrast,
our focus is on the collective reputation of otherwise autonomous ﬁrms.
More directly related are papers which explore the relationship between ﬁrm size
and incentives for reputation formation. These include Andersson (2002), Cabral (2000,
2007), Choi (1997), Dana and Speir (2006), who analyze the eﬀect of expanding the ﬁrm’s
product line (umbrella branding) on its reputation and proﬁt, Cai and Obara (2009), who
analyze the eﬀect of horizontal integration on the integrated ﬁrms’ cost of maintaining
its reputation, Rob and Fishman (2005), who show that a ﬁrm’s investment in quality
increases with size, Yacouel (2005) and Guttman and Yacouel (2006), who show that
larger ﬁrms beneﬁt more from a good reputation. All those papers are concerned with
size eﬀe c t so ni n c e n t i v e so fa ni n d i v i d u a lﬁrm governed by a centralized decision maker.
By contrast, our concern is with the eﬀect of changing the number of member ﬁrms of
ﬁxed size, each governed by a distinct and autonomous decision maker.
The most closely related literature is the literature on collective reputation, be-
5ginning with Tirole (1996). He analyzes how group behavior aﬀects individual incentive
to invest (behave honestly). Evans and Guinnane (2007) analyze the conditions under
which groups of heterogenous producers can create a common reputation and show that
a common reputation can be created only if the members are not too diﬀerent from each
other and if marginal costs are declining. In these papers the group’s size is ﬁxed ex-
ogenously. By contrast, our focus is precisely on the role of the group size on individual
incentives and, in particular, to compare a ﬁrm’s incentives when standing alone with
i t si n c e n t i v e sa sab r a n dm e m b e r .
There are also similarities between our approach and the common trait literature
(for example Benabou and Gertner, 1993, Fishman 1996), in which observation of one
agent’s behavior reveals information about a common trait which she shares with other
agents in the group. While in that literature the size of the group and the common
trait itself are exogenously given, our focus is to understand how inferences about the
common trait aﬀect incentives to join the group, and motivate reputation formation.
2M o d e l - S t a n d A l o n e F i r m s
We consider a market for an experience good - consumers observe quality only after
buying, but not at the time of purchase. There are two periods,2 N risk neutral ﬁrms
and we normalize the number of consumers per ﬁrm to be 1. There are two possible
product quality levels, low (l)a n dh i g h( h). Firms are of two types, H and L,w h i c h
are distinguished by their technological ability to produce high quality. The probability
with which a ﬁrm is able to produce high quality depends on its type and whether or
n o ti ti n v e s t si nq u a l i t y .A nL ﬁrm produces high quality with probability b whether or
not it invests. An H ﬁrm produces high quality with probability b if it does not invest
but if it invests, it produces high quality with probability g>b . All units produced by a
2It will be apparent that the qualitative properties of the model extend straightforwardly to any
horizon length, an extension which would complicate algebra and notation without adding insight. The
intuition of our analysis should also apply to a repeated game setting in which current quality depends
only on current investment.
6ﬁrm at any period are of the same quality. We denote by NH and NL the total number




Investment is “once and for all”: Prior to period 1, each ﬁrm decides whether or
not to invest and that investment determines the quality of the products it sells at every
future period3. The cost of investment is ﬁxed at e.4 We assume that g −b ≥ e,s ot h a t
investment is eﬃcient.
Each consumer is in the market for one period, has a demand for one (discrete)
unit at the most and exits the market at the end of the period. Her utility from a unit
of low quality is zero and her utility from a unit of high quality is 1. Consumers cannot
directly observe a ﬁrm’s type (whether it is H or L) and are also unable to observe
if a ﬁrm has invested or not. At period 1, consumers’ only information about ﬁrms is
their prior belief. We assume that at the beginning of period 2, each period 2 consumer
is informed (through interaction with consumers of the previous generation) about the
realized quality of each ﬁrm at the preceding period.5 This information is used to update
her expectations about ﬁrm quality at the second period.
In order to focus on the reputational eﬀects of collective branding on investment
incentives in the most direct possible way, it is convenient (though completely inessential
for our main results) to assume that ﬁr m sh a v em o n o p o l i s t i cm a r k e tp o w e r ;T h a ti s ,i f
consumers’ expected utility from a unit of ﬁrm i is vi, the price of ﬁrm i is vi.6 Thus
3This captures the idea that investment decisions are relatively inﬂexible in comparison to prices,
which are easy to change.
4One could consider a richer model in which the probability of high quality is an increasing function
of the amount invested. In that case, the intuition of our analysis suggests that whenever collective
branding increases investment incentives, the brand invests more than stand alone ﬁrms and delivers
higher expected quality.
5A more general formulation is that a consumer is informed about the ﬁrst period quality of α ≤ N
randomly selected ﬁrms.
6This could be because consumers have high transportation costs which eﬀectively endows ﬁrms with
local monopoly pricing power. Alternatively, consider a standard consumer sequential search market
setup: A consumer knows only the price distribution but not which ﬁrm charges what price, is randomly
and costlessly matched with one ﬁrm and can either buy from that ﬁrm or sequentially search for other
7branding cannot aﬀect ﬁrms’ pricing power or market share, and can only aﬀect ﬁrms’
investment incentives via reputational considerations.
An equilibrium speciﬁes for each ﬁrm whether or not it invests and its price at each
period, possibly as a function of previous quality realizations. Trivially, there always
exists an equilibrium in which no ﬁrm invests7.
The more interesting possibility is the existence of an ’investment equilibrium’
(IE)i nw h i c hH ﬁrms invest (L ﬁrms obviously don’t invest in any equilibrium since
investment has no eﬀect on their quality). Suppose there is such an equilibrium. At the
ﬁrst period no ﬁrm has any history. Therefore, given that H ﬁrms invest, the expected
utility from the product of any ﬁrm is ng +( 1 − n)b which is therefore the equilibrium
price of each ﬁrm. At the second period consumers update their beliefs on the basis
of the ﬁrms’ realized quality at the preceding period (recall that consumers observe the
ﬁrst period quality realization of each ﬁrm).
Let Pr(H | h) be the posterior belief at period 2 that a ﬁrm is type H given that
it produced high quality at period 1 and let Pr(H | l) be the posterior belief at period




gn+ b(1 − n)
.
Pr(H | l)=
(1 − g) n
(1 − g) n +( 1− b)(1 − n)
.
Thus the second period price of a ﬁrm which produced high quality at the ﬁrst period,
ph, is
ph = gPr(H | h)+bPr(L | h)=gPr(H | h)+b(1 − Pr(H | h)) (1)
= b +( g − b)Pr(H | h)=b +
(g − b)gn
gn+ b(1 − n)
.
ﬁrms, incurring a positive search cost at each search. As is well known, these assumptions imply that
ﬁrms have monopoly pricing power (Diamond, 1971).
7In this equilibrium consumers believe that no ﬁrm invests, which makes it optimal for ﬁrms not to
invest.
8The second period price of a ﬁrm which produced l at the ﬁrst period, pl, is
pl = gPr(H | l)+bPr(L | l)=gPr(H | l)+b(1 − Pr(H | l)) (2)
= b +( g − b)Pr(H | l)=b +
(g − b)(1 − g)n
(1 − g)n +( 1− b)(1 − n)
.
Let R be the expected second period revenues of an H ﬁrm that invests and R−1
the expected second period revenues of an H ﬁrm that doesn’t invest. Then, since its
probability of producing high quality is g if it invests and b if it doesn’t,
R = gph +( 1− g)pl
and
R−1 = bph +( 1− b)pl.
An H ﬁrm’s expected gain from investment is e1 ≡ R − R−1. By (1) and (2):




gn+ b(1 − n)
−
(1 − g)n
(1 − g)n +( 1− b)(1 − n)
¸
. (3)
Thus, when ﬁrms stand alone an IE exists only if e ≤ e1.
As t a n d-a l o n eﬁrm has only a limited opportunity to establish a reputation for
quality, since at period 2 consumers have only limited information about its past quality
- one observation in our formulation. Hence if e>e 1 an IE does not exist because the
cost of investment exceeds the individual ﬁrm’s expected return from maintaining a good
reputation.
We proceed to show below that collective branding can lead to higher quality by
increasing the incentive to invest and thus expanding the range of investment costs for
which an IE exists. That is, if two or more ﬁrms sell their product under a common
brand name, an IE may exist even when it does not exist if ﬁrms stand alone.
3 Collective Branding
We deﬁne a brand as two or more ﬁrms which market their products under a common
brand name, while retaining full autonomy with respect to all business decisions and
9retaining their own proﬁts. In particular, members of the brand decide individually
whether or not to invest in quality. We denote by m the brand size (the number of ﬁrms
which are members of the brand).
We are not committed to any speciﬁc process of brand formation but a convenient
way to think of brand formation is that ﬁrms mutually agree to share a brand name,
much as members of a cooperative mutually agree about its membership. We do assume
that ﬁrms discern each other’s type - i.e., can discern if a ﬁrm is type H or L. Accordingly,
we deﬁne a pure H -brand as a brand all of whose members are type H. Similarly a pure
L−brand is a brand all of whose members are type L. As is explained below, our focus
is on pure brands.
Consumers evaluate a ﬁrm’s quality on the basis of their experience with the brand
label which it carries and not only on the basis of its own past performance. That is, we
assume that a consumer who observes the qualities of j units from the same brand label,
whether from the same ﬁrm or from diﬀerent ﬁrms, forms her belief about the expected
quality of any ﬁrm associated with that brand on the basis of all j observations.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that all brands are pure and of size m, that consumers believe
that all members of H brands invest and the proportion of H brands (out of the total
number of brands of both types) is f. Then a consumer who observes that k members
of a brand produced high quality at the ﬁrst period and m − k produced low quality,
believes that the brand is type H with the probability
Pr(H | k,m)=
gk(1 − g)m−kf
gk(1 − g)m−kf + bk(1 − b)m−k(1 − f)
. (4)




k = gPr(H | k,m)+bPr(L | k,m)=gPr(H | k,m)+b(1 − Pr(H | k,m))
= b +( g − b)Pr(H | k,m). (5)
Collective branding provides consumers with more information about individual brand
members’ expected quality than if those ﬁrms stood alone (i.e., owned distinct individual
brand names) because instead of getting only one observation of quality per ﬁrm,a
10consumer now eﬀectively gets m>1 observations per brand. Therefore the reputation
of the brand aﬀects the proﬁt of its members more than their stand alone reputation
would. Speciﬁcally, as is established by Lemma 1 below, if all members of a pure H
brand invest, consumers are willing, on average, to pay each brand member a higher
p r i c et h a ni fi ti n v e s t e da sas t a n d - a l o n eﬁrm. Formally, let Rm be the expected second
period revenues of a member of a pure H−brand of size m when every member invests
a n dc o n s u m e r sb e l i e v et h a te a c hm e m b e ro fs u c hab r a n di n v e s t s .L e tRm
−1 be the same
for a member which alone does not invest (but all other members do invest). And let
Pr(k | H,m) be the probability that a pure H brand of size m produces k high quality











−1 =( 1− b)
m−1 X
k=0





Pr(k | H,m− 1)p
m
k+1.
Lemma 1 (reputation eﬀect): Rm and Rm
−1 are increasing in m for m ≥ 1
Proof:I nt h ea p p e n d i x
Thus, in the case of a pure H− brand, provided all members invest and consumers believe
that each member invests, the larger the brand, the more proﬁtable it is. In the case
of a pure L−brand the reverse is true; the greater the number of outcomes consumers
observe, the more likely they are to conclude that the brand is of type L, and the less
they are willing to pay for it. And yet, as we show below, in equilibrium, L ﬁrms form
L-brands to conceal their type.
Even in the case of a H− brand, however, brand membership may also have a
countervailing eﬀect by motivating ﬁrms to free ride on other members’ investment.
The eﬀect of collective branding on investment thus depends on the interaction of these
opposing eﬀects. Branding increases incentives to invest and leads to higher quality if
the reputation eﬀect dominates but can lead to lower quality if the free riding eﬀect
11dominates. We wish to determine the conditions under which brands have a greater
incentive to invest in quality than stand alone ﬁrms, and the eﬀect of the brand size on
these incentives.
We focus on equilibria in which all brands are pure. That is because this conﬁgura-
tion provides H ﬁrms with the greatest incentive to invest because the expected number
of high quality units, and therefore the price the brand commands, is greater if all mem-
bers are type H t h a ni fo n eo rm o r em e m b e r sa r et y p eL (see equations (4) and (5)).
Hence, collective branding has the greatest potential to lead to higher quality if brands
are pure. Moreover, for the same reason, it is natural to expect that H ﬁrms would only
admit other H ﬁrms into their ranks. Also, we consider symmetric equilibria, in which
all brands are of the same size. Henceforth, the terms ’H−brand’ and ’L−brand’ refer
to pure brands.
In analogy to the stand alone setting, we deﬁne a Brand IE (BIE) as an equilibrium
in which all brands are pure, are the same size, and each member of every H− brand
invests. In a BIE it must be individually optimal for each member of an H−brand to
invest and it must be more proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to be a member of the brand (and invest)
than to stand alone. The revenue of a stand alone H ﬁrm is max{R−1,R− e}.Thus in
a BIE:
R
m − e ≥ max{R
m
−1,R −1,R− e}.
By Lemma 1, for m ≥ 1,R m ≥ R and therefore the preceding inequality is equivalent
to:
R
m − e ≥ max{R
m
−1,R −1}. (7)
Recall that at the second period consumers observe the ﬁrst period realized quality
of each ﬁrm. Thus, under collective branding, by counting the number of observations
per brand consumers can deduce the brand size. Hence, in a BIE, it must be the case
that consumers cannot perfectly infer the brand type (whether H or L) by brand size
alone; otherwise H ﬁrms would have no incentive to invest.
Our primary aim is to determine circumstances under which a BIE exists when
12stand alone ﬁrms would not invest; that is, to determine when a BIE exists for e>e 1.
We shall consider two diﬀerent regimes. In the ﬁrst, called ’perfect monitoring’,
an H brand is able to monitor individual members’ investment and prevent ﬁrms which
do not invest from using the brand label. In that case, free riding is not an option and
so incentives to invest are driven only by the reputation eﬀect. In the second case, ‘no
monitoring’, the brand is unable to monitor its members’ investments.
3.1 Perfect Monitoring
Consider ﬁrst the ’perfect monitoring’ regime. In that case, a member of an H brand
must invest. Thus, for a brand of size m, condition (7) boils down to:
R
m − e ≥ R−1.
Let em solve the preceding inequality with equality; that is:
em ≡ R
m − R−1. (8)
Thus a necessary condition for the existence of a BIE in which all brands are of size
m is that e ≤ em. The following proposition states that the larger the brand size, the
greater the value of e for which a BIE exists.
Proposition 1 (i) em is strictly increasing in m for m ≥ 1.
(ii) For all m>1, a BIE exists for e1 <e≤ em.8
Proof:( i)B yL e m m a1 ,Rm is increasing in m.S i n c e R−1 is independent of
m, em = Rm − R−1 is increasing in m. In particular, for any m>1,e m >e 1.
(ii)F o re a c hm>1 we construct a BIE for e, e1 <e≤ em.S u p p o s et h a tNH <N L
(recall that NH and NL are the number of H and L ﬁrms respectively) 9 Let s be the
largest integer ≤
NH
m and r the largest integer ≤
NL
m .
8We restrict attention to e>e 1 since for e ≤ e1 even stand alone ﬁrms invest.
9If NH ≥ NL, then the proof holds for m ≤ NL.
13Let there be s pure H−brands, and r pure L−brands, each of size m. Let the
remaining NH−ms H−ﬁr m sa n dt h er e m a i n i n gNL−mr L -ﬁrms stand alone. Suppose
that the H−brands invest and the stand alone H−ﬁrms do not invest and let consumers’
beliefs be that H-b r a n d so fs i z em invest, that stand alone H ﬁrms do not invest, and
that any brand of size 6= m is an L brand. We now show that, given these beliefs, it is
optimal for each member of an H brand to invest and for stand alone H−ﬁrms not to
invest. An H ﬁrm’s proﬁta sam e m b e ro fa nH-b r a n di sRm−e w h i l ei fi ts t a n d sa l o n e
its proﬁti sR−1. Since,
R
m − e − R−1 = em − e
it’s optimal for an H -ﬁrm to be a brand member and invest if and only if e ≤ em.
Next consider L ﬁrms. As a member of the L brand, an L ﬁrm’s proﬁti sg r e a t e r
than b. 10 Given that the H -brands are of size m, any stand alone ﬁrm (or member
of brand of size 6= m) is identiﬁed by consumers as either an L -ﬁrm or a stand alone
H−ﬁrm that does not invest and hence cannot charge a price higher than b. Thus an L
-ﬁrm’s proﬁta sas t a n da l o n eﬁrm is less than its proﬁta saL−brand member. Hence,
L ﬁrms are also optimizing11. Hence, the preceding is a BIE for e1 <e≤ em.T h a t
completes the proof of the proposition.
Thus corresponding to any brand size, a BIE exists for e>e 1. Moreover, the larger the
brand size, the wider the range of investment costs which are compatible with investment
and the greater the proﬁt of each brand member. In particular, the highest range of
investment costs compatible with investment in quality and the highest proﬁtpe rm e m b e r
10By (5)
pm
k = b +( g − b)Pr(H | k,m) >b .
11Note that if the stand alone L−ﬁrms were to form a separate brand, since its size would be smaller
than m, i tw o u l db ep e r c e i v e da st y p eL and hence its members’ proﬁt would not increase. By the same
token, if any of those ﬁrms was admitted into one of the L - brands, its size would be greater than
m, hence would be perceived as an L− brand, decreasing existing members’ proﬁts. The same applies
to stand alone H− brands. However, if the sum of stand alone H and L ﬁrms ≥ m, there exists an
alternative equilibrium in which these ﬁrms form a ’hybrid’ brand of size m, in addition to the pure H
and L brands.
14corresponds to the BIE in which all the H -ﬁrms form a single H -brand.
This is very intuitive. Under perfect monitoring there is no opportunity to free
ride so only the reputation eﬀect is operative. But that eﬀect increases with brand size
because the larger the brand, the more observations consumers receive about the brand’s
type. Therefore, given that the brand is type H and that all members invest, the larger
the brand the more positive signals consumers receive on average and therefore the higher
the price they are willing to pay for that brand label.
Although there are multiple equilibria, the equilibrium in which all H ﬁrms are in
the same brand (of size NH) seems more stable than the others because it maximizes the
proﬁt of individual H ﬁr m s .T h u si ft h e r ei sm o r et h a no n eH brand, one might expect
the brands to merge into a larger brand to increase the proﬁt of both brands’ members.
As we show in the next subsection, this is no longer true if the brand cannot monitor its
members.
3.2 No Monitoring
The more realistic and interesting case is the one in which the brand is unable to perfectly
enforce investment by individual members. Therefore, we now consider the other extreme
case, in which each brand member decides on its own whether or not to invest and that
decision is undetectable by other brand members.
By Lemma 1, Rm and Rm
−1 are increasing in m, which implies that Rm ≥ R and
Rm
−1 ≥ R−1; Thus, condition (7) becomes:
R








Deﬁne e em ≡ Rm − Rm
−1; e em is the analog, for the no monitoring regime, of em for
the perfect monitoring regime, and represents the highest value of the investment cost
for which a BIE in which brands are of size m can exist under the no monitoring regime
(e em > 0 exists for any m b e c a u s ei ti se a s yt os e et h a tRm >R m
−1).
15For any e ≤ e em a BIE in which all pure brands are of size m can be constructed
in exactly the same way that it was constructed for the perfect monitoring regime in
the proof of Proposition 1. Our concern is to determine when e em >e 1. In the perfect
monitoring regime it was seen that em is increasing and therefore the larger the brand
size, the greater the range of investment costs corresponding to which a BIE exists.
Because of free riding, this is no longer the case in the no monitoring regime, as is
established by the following proposition (proved in the appendix).
Proposition 2 Under the no monitoring regime: (i) if g =1 , e em is increasing in m for
m ≥ 1. (ii) If g<1 and m is suﬃciently large, then e em <e 1 .
The key to understanding this Proposition is that Rm − Rm
−1 reﬂects the adverse
eﬀect of a single low quality observation on the brand’s reputation. Consider ﬁrst the
case g =1 ;that is, if an H ﬁrm invests, it produces high quality with certainty. In
that case, if the brand produces even a single low quality unit, consumers will believe
that the brand is type L (with probability 1) regardless of how many high quality units
it produces and be unwilling to pay it more than b. Therefore there is no free riding,
regardless of how large the brand is. On the other hand, if all members invest, the
consumers’ posterior probability that the brand is type H, and hence the price they are
willing to pay, increases with brand size, just as under perfect monitoring. Thus when
g =1 , an individual brand member’s loss from not investing, and hence its incentive to
invest, increases with m.
By contrast, if g<1, even when all brand members invest, some of the brand’s
units are low quality with positive probability, and this probability rises with the brand
size. Therefore, when g<1,t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of another low quality observation
declines with the brand’s size and therefore the free riding eﬀect eventually dominates
the reputation eﬀect if the brand is suﬃciently large. Thus, if g<1, for suﬃciently large
m, collective branding leads to lower quality than stand alone ﬁrms.
The preceding implies that without monitoring, if g<1,branding does not neces-
sarily enable more investment than stand alone ﬁrms. The following proposition (proved
16in the appendix) characterizes the conditions under which, nevertheless, e em >e 1 if m is
not too large. In particular, e em >e 1 if the diﬀerence between the expected quality of a
ﬁr mw h i c hi n v e s t sa n do n ew h i c hd o e s n ’ ti ss u ﬃciently large and/or if the proportion of
H ﬁrms in the ﬁrm population is suﬃciently small.
Proposition 3 (i) Given b, there is g∗ < 1 such that if 1 ≥ g ≥ g∗, then there is m0 > 1
such that e em0 >e 1.
(ii) Given b and g, there is n∗ > 0 such that if 0 <n≤ n∗ then there is m0 > 1
such that e em0 >e 1.
In words, if g is relatively large or n is relatively small, there is a brand size for which
each member has a greater incentive to invest than a stand alone ﬁrm.
The intuition for part (i) of the proposition is that even if g<1, but still close
to 1, a low quality observation is expected with low probability if the brand is not too
large. Therefore, a low quality observation still has a large eﬀect on consumers’ posterior
if the brand is relatively small, which discourages free riding. By contrast, if g is small,
consumers expect a low quality unit with relatively high probability even if the brand
is small, hence the marginal negative eﬀect of free riding on consumers’ posterior, and
consequently the incentive to invest, is small.
The intuition behind part (ii) is that the smaller the proportion of H ﬁrms, the
smaller is the proportion of H brands (cf proof of Proposition 1), hence the smaller
is the prior probability that a brand is type H, and hence the greater the impact of
each quality realization on the posterior probability that a brand is H. Put diﬀerently,
when the proportion of H brands is small, a greater number of successes is required to
convince consumers that the brand is indeed H and hence the greater the impact of each
high quality realization on the brands’s price. Hence the smaller is n,t h eg r e a t e rt h e
expected damage to the brand’s reputation from unilateral failure to invest and thus the
smaller the incentive to free ride. Therefore for suﬃciently small n the reputation eﬀect


































The proposition is illustrated in the ﬁgure, where Rm and Rm
−1 are sketched for
the parameters b =0 .2,g=0 .95 and f =0 .2. For these parameters, e1 =0 .015, which
in the ﬁgure is represented by the vertical distance between R and R−1, at m =1 . For
m =2 ,3,4,5 and 6, e em >e 1 (where em is represented by the distance between Rm and
Rm
−1). Thus, for example if e =0 .02,as t a n da l o n eﬁrm would not invest but all H−
brands invest if 2 ≤ m ≤ 5 and do not invest if m ≥ 6. Note that in this case the brand
size which maximizes H-b r a n d ’ sp r o ﬁts is m =5 . T h a ti sb e c a u s ea sl o n ga st h eb r a n d
size is small enough to deter free riding, the brand member’s proﬁt increases with the
brand size.
4 The Optimal Brand Size
What is the ’optimal’ brand size? For a given value of the investment cost, say e0, all
values of m for which e em >e 0 are equally eﬃcient in the sense that each of these brand
18sizes lead to the eﬃcient outcome of investment by H ﬁrms. Thus in the example sketched
in Figure 1, if e =0 .015, brands of size 2,3,4 and 5 are equally eﬃc i e n t . T h es a m ei s
not true with respect to ﬁrms’ proﬁts, however. By lemma 1, for a given value of e, the
larger the brand size, the more information consumers have and therefore the higher the
price they are willing to pay to an H brand, on average. Therefore, given e0, the brand
size which maximizes ﬁrms’ proﬁts12 is the largest m satisfying the requirement that
e em ≥ e0. Thus in our example, the brand size which maximizes ﬁrms’ expected proﬁti s
m =5 .
An alternative notion is that the socially optimal brand size is the one under which
the eﬃcient outcome is realized in the widest range of circumstances; that is, that the
larger is ˜ em, the better. Proposition 1 implies that in this sense there is indeed a socially
optimal brand size which maximizes e em. In the example, the brand size which is optimal
in this sense is 3 where ˜ e3 =0 .055.
The preceding is subject to the caveat that we have assumed away any eﬀects of
branding on pricing by considering a model with unit demand and monopoly power.
In a more general setting, brand size may also aﬀect welfare adversely by facilitating
collusion. In that case the socially optimal brand size would have to balance the positive
eﬀect of branding on reputation building against its negative eﬀect on prices.
5 Concluding Remarks
Collective Brands and State Trading Enterprises are often perceived as a means of fos-
tering collusion and therefore as an obstacle to eﬃcient markets. On these grounds,
they have been targeted by free market advocates in recent WTO rounds. Here we take
a contrasting view, arguing that by aﬀecting reputational incentives, these institutions
can increase eﬃciency and welfare by enabling higher product quality than would be
attainable in their absence.
12The reverse is true for L ﬁrms - the larger the brand size and the more information consumers have,
the lower their proﬁt. Nevertheless in equilibrium, these ﬁrms must form brands of the same size as H
ﬁrms to keep from being detected as L ﬁrms on the basis of brand size alone.
19In our model, collective branding can lead to greater investment, and higher quality,
in two senses. First, the institution of collective branding enables investment in quality
under conditions when stand alone ﬁr m sw o u l dn o ti n v e s t-s p e c i ﬁcally when e1 <e<
e em. Second, while we have assumed that all ﬁrms are able to form brands, in reality
institutional, ﬁnancial and other exogenous factors may prevent some ﬁrms from forming
brands. For example, in the case of regional brands (Jaﬀa oranges, Champagne wines,
Washington apples and so on) a geographical region may be too small to support the
critical number of ﬁrms required to support investment. In such cases, only ﬁrms which
succeed in forming brands invest and command commensurately high prices while ﬁrms
w h i c ha r ep r e v e n t e df r o mf o r m i n go rj o i n ing brands stand alone and don’t invest.
Because the equilibrium we derive is pooled - both L and H ﬁrms form brands
- branding per se is not a signal of quality in our model. Rather, all brand members
command higher prices than stand alone ﬁrms and high quality H brands, by investing,
acquire a good reputation and command higher prices than L brands, which fail to
acquire such a reputation.
It would nevertheless be interesting to formulate a model which has a separating
equilibrium, in which only H ﬁr m sf o r mb r a n d sa n dL ﬁrms don’t. Recall that in
our model such an equilibrium doesn’t exist because consumers observe the ﬁrst period
records of all ﬁrms, and can therefore tell which ﬁrms are brand members and which
stand alone. Thus the key to achieving a separating equilibrium would be to formulate
the model so that consumers cannot perfectly tell if a ﬁrm is a brand member. For
example, suppose that at the second period a consumer observes a random number of
observations of the ﬁrst period quality of the ﬁr mf r o mw h i c hi tb u y sa sw e l la sar a n d o m
number of observations of some other ﬁrms. Then a consumer who buys from a ﬁrm
about whose label she has only one observation, she cannot tell for sure if that ﬁrm is
stand alone or a brand member.
There are interesting parallels between our characterization of collective brands as
vehicles of reputation formation and franchisees of chain stores and restaurants. Like a
20member of a collective brand, a franchisee is aﬀected by and aﬀects the reputation of
the entire chain. Therefore it may be motivated to free ride on the chain’s reputation
and for this reason is closely regulated by chain ownership. Indeed, Jin and Leslie (2008)
present evidence, that chain-aﬃliation is indeed a source of reputational incentives which
may drive chain restaurants to have better hygiene than independent restaurants. They
also ﬁnd that franchisees invest less in hygiene than company owned restaurants of the
same chain, which they interpret as evidence of free riding by franchisees on the chain
reputation.
In contrast to franchises, the collective brand has no centralized ownership or
control and each member is an autonomous ﬁrm. What we have shown is that despite
incentives for free riding, collective branding can create greater reputational incentives
than is possible with stand alone ﬁrms, even in the absence of a centralized ownership
and even in the complete absence of any regulation or monitoring.
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P r o o fo f( i): Let us divide the m members into two separate groups, the ﬁrst of
which includes m−1 members and the second includes the remaining member. Suppose
that the ﬁrst group produces h, 0 ≤ h ≤ m − 1 high quality and m − 1 − h low quality
units. Since the mth ﬁrm is also investing, its success probability is g and therefore the




h+1 +( 1− g)p
m
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which completes the proof of (i)
24P r o o fo f( ii): Let us divide the m members into two separate groups, the ﬁrst
of which includes m − 1 members which invest and the second of which includes the
remaining single member which doesn’t invest. Suppose that the ﬁrst group produces h
high quality and m − 1 − h low quality units. Since the mth ﬁrm does not invest, its





h+1 +( 1− b)p
m
h .















which completes the proof of (ii).
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which is always positive.
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
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2 > 0. (11)
Thus, Rm − Rm−1 > 0 for every m>1 and it follows that Rm is increasing with
m. The proof for Rm
−1 is analogous. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
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h ) > 0
where the last inequality follows immediately from equations (4) and (5). Hence, and
since by Lemma 1 Rm
−1 >R −1, it follows from equation (7) that ﬁrms belonging H brands
invest. Hence, e em = em which by Proposition 1 is increasing with m.That proves part
(i) of the proposition.










































Note that q>0 and is strictly decreasing with h. Hence, for any given m,t h e r e
is at most one value of h, denoted h∗, for which q =1 .I fh<h ∗,t h e nq>1, implying
limm→∞ qm = ∞ and it follows that limm→∞ Am
h =0 . If h>h ∗,t h e nq<1, implying
limm→∞ qm =0and it follows that limm→∞ Am
h =0 . If h = h∗,t h e nq =1 , in which case
Am
h∗ is some ﬁnite number.
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since limm→∞ Pr(h∗ | H,m − 1) = 0. This completes the proof of part (iii),w h i c h
completes the proof of the proposition.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We prove parts (i) and (ii) by showing that (i) and (ii) hold for m0 =2 . That is, we will
show that: (i) Given b, there is g∗ < 1 such that if g>g ∗, then R2 −R2
−1 >e 1 and (ii):
Given b and g, there is n∗ > 0 such that if 0 <n≤ n∗ then R2 − R2
−1 >e 1.























Substituting equation (5) and equation (4) yields
R2 − R2
−1
(g − b)2 =( 1 − g)
∙
g(1 − g)f
g(1 − g)f + b(1 − b)(1 − f)
−
(1 − g)2f
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Recalling that e1 = R − R−1 and substituting (3) for R − R−1 it follows that
R2 − R2
−1 − e1






















(g − b)2 =
(g−b)2c2
(1−g)g
1+( z + s)c + zsc2 · B
where
B ≡ z
(z + s + zsc)+z2sc
1+( z + s)zc+ z3sc2 − s
(z + s + zsc)+zs2c
1+( z + s)sc + zs3c2
=
(s − z)(1 + zsc)
£
(zsc)
2 − (z + s + zsc)
¤
[1 + (z + s)zc+ z3sc2][1+(z + s)sc + zs3c2]
.
Note that R2 − R2
−1 >e 1 if and only if B>0.
Since the denominator of the preceding expression is positive and z<1 and s>1,
then B>0 if and only if Y ≡ (zsc)2 − (z + s + zsc) > 0.
Y is quadratic with a single positive root, c∗, and is positive for all c ≥ c∗. Since
f is strictly decreasing with c it follows that there exists f∗ =1 /(1 + c∗) > 0 such that
if 0 <f<f ∗ then Y> 0 and B>0.
29Deﬁne n∗ such that
n∗NH
NH − n∗ = f
∗.
It is easy to see that if n ≤ n∗, then
NH
NH + NL − 1
<f
∗.
On the other hand, if NH and NL both divide by 2 f = n, if NL divide by 2 and NH does
not, f =
NH−1




NH + NL − 1
<
NH
NH + NL − 1
<
NH
NH + NL − 1
.
Hence, whether NH and NL divide by 2, if 0 <n<n ∗ then f ≤ f∗ and it follows that
Y> 0 and B>0 which completes the proof of (ii).





















It is easily seen that as g → 1,Y→∞ .S i n c eY is continuous in g,it follows that there
exists g∗ < 1 such that Y> 0 for all g>g ∗, which proves (i).
Thus, by (i) and (ii), the proposition is satisﬁed for m0 =2,which completes the
proof of the proposition.
30Electronic versions of the papers are available at 
http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/working_papers.html 
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